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Abstract 
 
Can Banks’ statistics, indicators, performance, and efficiency provide us with any indications about the causes of Arab Spring? 
This paper examines the 74 banks’ perspective on of Arab countries, where the Arab Spring occurred in Egypt, Libya, Syria, 
Tunisia and Yemen, versus 241 banks in other fifteen Arab countries. The paper analyzed the aggregate balance sheet items 
and income statement entries as well as recent trends in total assets, deposits, equity, and net income growth. The paper also 
examines the evolution of 315 Arab banks over 14 years from 1997 to 2010 of many ratios including Asset quality, capital, 
operations, and liquidity, and financial soundness. The results show that the majority of banks in the five countries were below 
the average in their performance. Their ranking, regionally and globally, in terms of the size, performance, and efficiency were 
weak. The regional and world ranking of these banks gives a glance about the business atmosphere and the economic 
conditions at these five countries. 
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 Introduction 1.
 
The Arab Spring refers to the crop of pro-democracy uprisings in 2011 sweeping the Arab countries in the Middle East 
and North Africa. The Arab Spring began in Tunisia, with the self-immolation of a vegetable seller outside a government 
building in protest at police harassment. This kicked off a wave of protests that ended with the ouster of Tunisian 
president Ben Ali. Similar protests soon followed around the Middle East and North Africa region. As result of those 
protests, the presidents of four Arab countries were changed: Ben Ali president of Tunisia, Mubarak president of Egypt, 
Ali Abdullah Saleh president of Yemen, Muamar Qadhafi president of Libya. At the time of writing, there have been 
demonstration and fighting in Syria aiming to change the presidency of Bashar Al-Assad. The putative aim of the Arab 
Spring was to overthrow oppressive dictatorships and hopefully bring in more accountable democratic governments 
which would put the interests of people first rather than just the interest of the ruling family. 
What were the main reasons for the Arab spring? Were the causes primarily political? Or were the economic 
factors the main motive? Or, was it a combination of socio-economic factors, what were the indicators of that? If, it was 
economic, were there any indicators signifying the problem might happen soon? Since banks are the main financial 
institutions in any country, including Arab countries, would their statistics, indicators, performance and efficiency provide 
us with any indications about the causes of the Arab Spring? Therefore, the aim of this paper is to read and to analyse 
some of the socio-economic statistics with an emphasis on analysing the size, efficiency and performance of Arab banks 
for a period of 14 years from 1997 to 2010. This interval covers the time before the Arab spring started. The paper 
examines the banks’ perspective on Arab countries especially five countries namely: Egypt, Libya, Syria, Tunisia and 
Yemen with the aim to answer why the demonstrations occurred in these countries.  
The banking system reflects the economy, particularly the private sector, real economy, trade and tourism. The paper 
argues that banks’ performance in a country is a good indicator of the socio-economic conditions in the Arab world.  The 
relative performance of banks in a country to other banks in other countries can tell how good or bad the people’s condition is 
within that country. In the absence of socio-economic indicators, banks’ performance indicators can be used as an alternative 
and give a very close picture about the economic conditions and the investment environment. Good performance of banks 
indicates the excellent investment climate and the open market of that country. On the other hand, bad performance of banks 
indicates the poor investment climate and lack of growth as well as a tightly controlled private sector. 
The paper is structured into four sections. The remainder of this study is organized as follows. Section II provides 
the background about Arab banking. Section III illustrates the Performance Indicators and Analysis. Finally, Section IV 
concludes the study. 
 
 Background About Arab Banking 2.
 
The Arab world is located in the Continents of Asia and Africa. It comprises 22 countries and it is distinguished by its 
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strategic position because it links three continents: Africa, Asia and Europe. It is surrounded by important bodies of water, 
straits and canals giving it multiple points of access. The population of the Arab World was about 372 million in 2010 with 
an absolute annual growth of 7.5 million. The most populated country was Egypt with around 84 million representing 
about 22.55% of the total Arab population. Comoros was the least populated country with 773,000 people.  
Adding to its strategic position, Arab countries are also a source of oil and other mineral resources. Most of the 
deposits of oil in the world are found in the Arab countries. Saudi Arabia is the largest exporter of oil in the world. Therefore, 
the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of many of the Arab countries depends on oil and gas as a main source of their revenue.  
Figure 1 represents the relative size of the economies of the Arab countries. The total GDP of the Arab countries 
was US$ 1,903,301 million in 2010. Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates and Egypt ranked first, second and third where 
their total GDP’s in 2010 were US$ 434,440 million, US$ 239,650 million and US$ 216,830 million respectively. Comoros 
ranked last and its GDP was US$ 557 million. Most of the top ranked countries with higher GDP’s depend mainly on oil 
and gas as the main source of the country’s revenue. The highest GDP’s per capita are in the countries of the Gulf 
Cooperation Council (GCC) namely, Qatar, United Arab Emirates (UAE), Kuwait, Bahrain, Oman and Saudi Arabia being 
ranked 1 to 6 respectively. Libya, Tunisia, Syria, Egypt and Yemen were ranked 7, 11, 13, 14 and 19 correspondingly.  
 
 
 
Figure 1: Relative size of the economies of Arab countries 
Source: Compiled by the researcher from IMF GDP data 
 
In addition, Figure 2 is illustrates the evolution of four financial variables. The first and the second financial variables are 
the total assets and total equity. Both total assets and total equity kept growing over the 14 year period even during the 
global financial crisis which affected many financial institutions starting in 2007. There were many reasons for this growth: 
First, an increase in the accumulation of retained earning where banks maintain the greater portion of their profit to 
expand in size and to compete with other financial institutions as well as the existence of investment opportunities in 
some Arab countries specially GCC countries. Second, the increase of oil and gas prices created more liquidity in some 
Arab banks which enabled them to provide more loans to different economy sectors as well as more loans to households. 
Third, the existence of investment was expanding in different types of securities such as bonds, shares, and Sukuk for 
Islamic banks. Fourth, both total assets and total equity kept growing over the 14 years because of the proceeds from 
stocks offering and borrowing funds. 
 
 
Figure 2: Evolution of some financial variables 
Source: Compiled by the researcher from Bankscope 
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The third variable, in Figure 2, is the evolution of deposits and short term funding. The sharp increase in this variable 
could be explained by the higher revenue of some Arab governments and business institutions, in addition to the 
increased confidence of local and foreign investors. Second, some Arab banks issued different short term debt 
instruments of bonds and Sukuk. These banks got the investors’ confidence in investing in such debt securities. Finally, 
Figure 2 shows the evolution of the net income variable. The progress of this variable could be divided into four different 
periods. First, there was slow growth of net income for the period from 1997 to 2003 with an exception for 1999. Second, 
sharp growth followed the first period in net income from 2003 to 2007. The increase in oil and gas prices had a 
significant impact on the performance and profit of banks in Arab producing oil and gas countries. Then, there was a 
sharp decrease in net income from 2007-2009. The performance of most Arab banks was hit by the global financial crisis 
in 2008 and 2009. Consequently, the overall profit decreased for those two years. However, in 2010 the momentum of 
growth was back and witnessed a lift up in net income growth. 
Analysis of the aggregate balance sheet of 315 commercial and Islamic banks provides us with Figure 3. Looking 
at the liability side, 78% of the total liabilities were deposits and short term funding, while equity or the owners’ capital 
represent only 13.2% of the total liabilities. Even though the owners’ capital represents only 13.2% of the total liabilities, 
however, Arab banks were meeting the required Capital Adequacy Rate (CAR) of a minimum of 8% of risk weighted 
assets set by Bank for International Settlements (BIS). On the assets side, 52.5% of Arab banks assets were in the form 
of loans to households, different business sectors, and governments. Out of the total assets, only 1.3% was fixed assets. 
45.1% of the total assets were invested in different types of investments of which 34.9% were earning assets and 11.2% 
non-earning assets. As we will see when analysing the income statement in Figure 4 most of Arab banks revenue was 
coming from interest based from loans or from fixed income investment securities. Arab banks invested more in their 
retail operations during the 14 year period, partly because of the slow pace of corporate lending due to the small size of 
the private sectors as well as the uncertainty of the global economic outlook. 
 
 
Figure 3: Structure of balance sheet of  315 banks in 2010 
Source: Compiled by the researcher from Bankscope 
 
Finally, off-balance sheet activities encompass a variety of items including certain loan commitments, certain letters of 
credit, and revolving underwriting facilities. Additionally, swaps, futures, forwards and option contracts are derivative 
instruments whose notional values are carried off-balance sheet, but whose fair values are recorded on the balance 
sheet.  
Figure 4 illustrates the breakdown of the relevancy of the income statement’s entries to the operating income. The 
right side of Figure 4 shows the component of operating income. As shown in Figure 3 of the balance sheet 52.5% of 
Arab banks assets were in the form of loans; therefore, 67.9% of the operating revenue came from interest related 
revenue. Other operating income represents 32.4% of the operating income coming from different non-interest related 
revenues such as different services fees as well as dividends from their share in different investments. On the left side, 
Figure 4 shows that 39.9% of the operating income was spent in overheads. 17.7% of the operating income used on loan 
loss provisions. Overall, the profit tax in Arab countries, especially GCC countries, is not high; as a result, governments 
profit taxes represented only 4.9% of the operating income. After deducting different types of expenses, 35.3% represent 
the net income of the operating income. This percentage is considered to be a very good rate. 
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Figure 4: Structure of Profit and Loss Account of 315 banks in 2010 
Source: Compiled by the researcher from Bankscope 
 
 The Performance Indicators and Analysis 3.
 
The total population of Egypt, Libya, Syria, Yemen and Tunisia, hereafter the five countries, represents 39.7% of the Arab 
population and the total land area represents 27.5% of total Arab land. Going back to the question: Can banks give 
indications of the socio-economic conditions of these five countries relative to other Arab countries? Considering the size 
of their area, population, strategic location, existing and potential diversified sources of income sources, and their early 
development compared to many Arab countries, one would expect that these five countries would have the lead among 
Arab countries in all the indicators including the financial institutions’ indicators. 
Analysing Table 1, which ranks Arab banks regionally and globally according 2010 data, we can see interesting 
observations: First, Qatar National Bank was the largest in size measured by its total asset size. This bank was ranked as 
number one in Qatar and in the Arab World, but its World rank was 255. This finding coincides with Al-Muharrami et. al 
(2006) that Arab banks are relatively small in size. Arab countries have not been able to produce large powerhouse 
financial institutions that could be a force in the international banking arena. They need to strengthen their position 
through consolidation in order to compete effectively with international banks. Therefore, the size of the banking sector in 
Arab countries, in absolute terms, is relatively small when compared to those of other developed countries.   
 
Table 1: Regional and worldwide size ranking of selected Arab banks by the total assets  
 
Arab Rank Bank Name Country Total Assets million US$ Country rank by assets World rank by assets 
1 Qatar National Bank Qatar 82,955 1 255 
2 National Commercial Bank Saudi A. 80,319 1 259 
3 Emirates NBD UAE 77,499 1 267 
4 National Bank of Abu Dhabi UAE 69,617 2 293 
5 Al Rajhi Bank Saudi A. 58,884 2 345 
6 National Bank of Egypt Egypt 51,447 1 385 
7 Samba Financial Group Saudi A. 51,406 3 387 
8 Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank UAE 50,027 3 398 
9 National Bank of Kuwait Kuwait 48,912 1 405 
10 Kuwait Finance House Kuwait 48,312 2 409 
11 Riyad Bank Saudi A. 48,237 4 410 
12 Arab Bank Group (Combined) Jordan 45,263 1 439 
13 First Gulf Bank UAE 42,881 4 458 
14 Attijariwafa Bank Morocco 41,380 1 474 
15 Banque Saudi Fransi Saudi A. 37,461 5 516 
35 Commercial Bank of Syria Syria 18,550 1 847 
42 Libyan Foreign Bank Libya 15,908 1 929 
90 Banque Internationale Arabe de Tunisie Tunisia 5,066 1 1943 
154 Tadhamon International Islamic Yemen 1,711 1 3469 
 
Source: Compiled by the researcher from Bankscope 
 
Second, Out of 15 banks, there were 12 banks from 4 of the GCC countries. These 12 banks were among the biggest 
economies in Arab countries. Saudi Arabia, UAE, Qatar and Kuwait were 1st, 2nd, 5th and 6th biggest economies in terms 
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of GDP. Third, none of the biggest 15 banks were from Libya, Syria, Tunisia, or Yemen. Even though, as mentioned 
earlier, the size of the banking sector in Arab countries, in absolute terms, was relatively small when compared to those 
of other developed countries, yet the banking sectors at the five countries were relatively even smaller. The largest bank 
in Egypt was the National Bank of Egypt ranked 385 in the world. Table 1 shows that the Commercial Bank of Syria, 
Libyan Foreign Bank, Banque Internationale Arabe de Tunisie and Tadhamon International Islamic were the biggest 
banks measured by total asset size in Syria, Libya, Tunisia and Yemen respectively. They were not among the top big 
banks and their world rank in 2010 was 846, 929, 1944 and 3469 in that order. Banks in Libya, Syria, Tunisia and Yemen 
did not exist among the big banks which reflected the poor GDP’s volume, size of markets and the performance of all 
sectors in the five countries’ economies. The performance of all business sectors was not the best and relative banks 
performance regionally is a reflection of what was happening in terms of markets’ size, local investors’ confidence, 
attraction of foreign investors and creation of jobs.      
One measure of profitability is used in this section namely Return on Average Asset (ROAA). ROAA reflects a 
bank’s management ability to utilize the bank’s financial and real investment resources to generate profits, specifically to 
measure the profit earned per currency of assets. This ratio depends mainly on the bank’s policy as well as some 
external factors related to the economy and government regulations. ROAA incorporates the external and internal factors 
that affect the bank’s performance. It indicates which banks were the best in utilizing their size to make the highest return. 
The comparison among banks based on ROAA gives us an indication as to how efficient the management was in 
creating the best outcome by utilizing the input they have.  
Table 2 ranks the most efficient banks and shows us fascinating observations. First, generally speaking the smaller 
banks were more efficient than bigger banks. Qatar National Bank which was the biggest in terms of size and first in term 
of income, ranked 27 according to ROAA. Second, Islamic banks were among the best performers indicating that they 
were utilizing their input to get the best output much more efficiently than commercial banks. This coincides with many 
studies that Islamic banks are more efficient than commercial banks in Arab countries. For example, Al-Muharrami (2008) 
uses DEA techniques to estimate technical, pure technical and scale efficiency, using an input orientation for GCC banks 
for the period 1993 to 2002. He highlighted interesting findings regarding the GCC banking market. First, smaller banks 
exhibited superior performance in terms of overall technical efficiency than did larger ones. Second, Islamic banks were 
more successful in both the adoption of the best available technology and choosing optimal levels of output.  
Finally, Table 2 shows that there were no banks from Egypt, Libya, Tunisia and Yemen as the top best banks in 
terms of ROAA. This shows that, not only the bad investment environment in the 5 countries, but also the inefficiency of 
the banks’ management teams.  
Generally, the connection between the growth of economy and the performance of banks is straightforward. 
Kosmidou (2008), among others, found that the growth of GDP has a significant and positive impact on ROAA. Therefore, 
slow or zero growth of the GDP has an effect on the operation of the private sector including the financial institutions. 
Therefore, Table 2 does not include any bank out of 74 banks from the five countries because of the slow growth of the 
economies of those five countries. 
 
Table 2: Top 15 Arab banks based on ROAA in 2010 
Rank Bank Name Country ROAA  % Ranking in size 
1 Citi Islamic Bank Bahrain 24.48 277 
2 Seera Bank Bahrain 13.00 215 
3 CSC Bank SAL Lebanon 11.21 257 
4 Elaf Islamic Bank Iraq 11.11 255 
5 Gulf Commercial Bank Iraq 8.07 251 
6 Trust Bank Algeria Algeria 6.91 224 
7 National Bank of Ras Al-Khaimah UAE 5.25 74 
8 Bahrain Commercial Facilities Bahrain 4.93 222 
9 Bank of Baghdad Iraq 4.75 223 
10 Bank of Iraq Iraq 4.07 250 
11 Gulf Bank Algeria Algeria 3.92 196 
12 Credit Europe Bank (Dubai) UAE 3.71 239 
13 Rajhi Bank Saudi A. 3.64 5 
14 North Bank Iraq 3.61 197 
15 United Arab Bank UAE 3.56 122 
Source: Compiled by the researcher from Bankscope                                                                                                                                 
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After looking at the general individual ranking of each bank, the paper next makes a comparison based on an aggregate 
basis between two groups. The whole sample was split into two categories. The first category consists of 74 (65 
commercial and 9 Islamic) banks in Egypt, Libya, Syria, Tunisia and Yemen; and the second category contains 241 (170 
commercial and 71) Islamic banks in other 15 Arab countries. The comparison summarizes the growth and evolution of 
some financial variables and ratios. It compares the aggregate growth, performance and efficiency of 74 banks versus the 
remaining 241 banks.  
Table 3 illustrates some fascinating observations: First, the total assets of both groups had grown over years; 
however, the total assets of 74 banks in the 5 countries grew at a lower pace compared to the total assets of 241 banks 
in the 15 countries. In 2010, their total assets were only US$ 256,105 million representing 12.8% of the total. The slower 
growth of the 74 banks’ total assets was a manifestation of the slow economic expansion in the five countries. Second, 
there was a constant growth in net income except for 2008 and 2009 of the 241 banks and for 2009 of the 74 banks. In 
2010, the total income of the 74 banks was US$ 2,259 million representing only 8.8% of the total. Thus, both total assets 
and net income variables indicate that humble growth and performance of the 74 banks. These, two among other 
financial, variables were below the average of Arab countries indicating the size of the market and type of activities that 
are available for banks in these 5 countries to invest.  
Third, most bankers and examiners will agree that the single greatest risk in banking is the risk of loan losses. This 
is because loans typically comprise a majority of the assets in most banks. It is not hard to imagine an entire year’s worth 
of earnings being completely eliminated because of one or two large loans being charged off. Arab banks had 
considerable experience with bad loans as a result of the global financial crisis and because of slow economic growth for 
some countries. Examination of the breakdown of the balance sheets for both groups in Figure 5 shows that only 36.2% 
of the total assets of 74 banks in 2010 went to loans. The majority of their assets, 50.9%, was invested in earning assets. 
This indicates that due to the slow economic growth in the five countries, their banks were trying to avoid involving 
themselves in risky loans and preferred to invest in other earning assets such as different types of securities. Due to the 
market conditions, their decision was to invest in other less risky instruments with lower return than providing loans to 
individuals and business’ sectors. Therefore, the markets’ conditions forced banks to make that decision. 
 
 
 
Figure 5: Comparative breakdown of the balance sheets items of 74 versus 241 banks in 2010 
Source: Compiled by the author from Bankscope 
 
There is a relationship between an economy’s conditions and banks’ Non-Performing Loans (NPL: those loans which are 
90 days or more past due or in nonaccrual status). During an economic crisis, in order to restore the credibility among 
creditors and depositors, banks not only try to expand their equity bases, but also reduce their risk assets or change the 
composition of the assets portfolio. As a result of such defensive action, the business debtors are always targeted, thus 
preventing the overall economic growth. Thus, in consequence of poor economic conditions and the depressed economic 
growth, the level of NPL increases leading banks to be more reluctant to provide additional credits to the private sector. 
Therefore, the production sector is further weakened, resulting in decreases in aggregate demand. Again, even worse 
borrowers’ conditions create more NPL. 
Also, the high level of NPL requires banks to raise provision for loan loss that decreases the banks’ revenue and 
reduces the funds for new lending. The cutback of loans impairs the business sector as they have difficulties in expanding 
their working capital, blocking their chances of resuming normal operation or growing. Unavailability of credit to finance 
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firm’s working capitals and investments might trigger the second round business failure which in turn worsens the quality 
of bank loans, resulting in a re-emerging of banking or financial failure. In the worst case, it triggers an endless vicious 
liquidity spiral. 
Analysing the assets quality of these banks, the ratios show the overall of the following financial ratio: Loan Loss 
Reserve / Gross Loans, NPL / Gross Loans, Net Charge-off (NCO) / Average Gross Loans, and Nonperforming loans/ 
Equity. These entire ratios witnessed the superiority of 241 banks over the 74 banks in terms of the assets quality ratios. 
For example, in 2010 the nonperforming loans to the gross loans of the 241 banks were 5.52% versus 13.58% for the 74 
banks.  
The volume of NPL has declined for 15 countries’ banks. That was evidenced by their shrinking provision 
expenses (or charges against earnings to build loan loss reserves) and therefore rising profits. Unfortunately, this 
improving regional trend is not emerging across the five countries. As illustrated in Table 3, nonperforming loans appear 
to have increased in volume and the ratio of nonperforming loans to total loans increased at a high rate at year-end 2010 
reaching 13.58% across all banks in the five countries. For 74 banks, the ratio climbed in 2009 and 2010 after a modest 
decline through 2004 to 2008. The increase in nonperforming loans signals the weakness and the recession that had 
faced the economies of the five countries. The slowdown in the five countries’ gross domestic product could be the main 
factor that impacted banks' asset quality. As the GDP growth slows, the problems for the banking sector are far from 
over. 
Fourth, examining the capital adequacy ratios, these ratios also demonstrated the supremacy of the 241 banks 
over the 74 banks. For instance, in 2010 the ratio of equity to total assets was 13.83% opposed to 9.26% for 241 banks 
and 74 banks respectively. The Basel Accord of 1988 attempted to deal with the diversity in institutional activities by 
applying different credit risk weights to different positions and by including in the base for the capital ratio a measure of 
the off-balance sheet exposures of the bank. In spite of these calibrations, the intent was not to determine an exact 
appropriate level of capital for the bank, but rather to provide a more flexible way of determining the minimum required 
level (see Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 1988). Banks are now classified as “adequately capitalized” if they 
meet the Basel requirements, but new distinctions among levels of capital were introduced. For example, a bank is “well 
capitalized” if it holds a certain buffer above the “adequate” levels. In contrast, a bank that falls under a specific level, set 
somewhat below the minimum “adequate” level, is determined to be “critically undercapitalized” and must be shut down 
by supervisors. An aggregate capital ratio of 74 banks would be considered to be moving from below the minimum 
adequate to adequate level of meeting the capital requirement condition. 
Fifth, the operation ratios show the weak position of 74 banks. The 74 banks were worse managed and less 
efficient in terms of reducing cost, utilizing the size, and utilizing the available input to have an outstanding output. The 
profitability ratios were less; the return on average assets was 0.93% for 74 banks whereas the return on average assets 
was 1.40% for 241 banks in 2010. As consequences of the bad economic conditions the profitability and the efficiency of 
these 74 banks in the 5 countries was affected. 
Finally, investigating liquidity ratios gives us an indication about the liquidity risk. Liquidity risk is the probability the 
financial firm will not have sufficient cash and borrowing capacity to meet deposit withdrawals and other cash needs. If 
more than 60-70% of total assets are loaned out, the bank is considered to be highly illiquid. On the other hand, keeping 
too much liquidity in forms of cash or liquid assets has the advantage of being ready to meet the liquidity demand, yet 
liquid assets tend to award a lower return.  
Liquidity risk, arising from the possible inability of a bank to accommodate decreases in liabilities or to fund 
increases on the assets’ side of the balance sheet, is considered an important determinant of bank profitability. The loans 
market, especially credit to households and firms, is risky and has a greater expected return than other bank assets, such 
as government securities. Thus, one would expect that the fewer the funds tied up in liquid investments the higher we 
might expect profitability to be (Eichengreen and Gibson, 2001). 
The liquidity ratios show that the 74 banks were keeping more liquid assets than the 241 banks. This could explain 
the lower return of the 74 banks in these five countries. However, keeping cash or liquid assets is not always an internal 
issue within a bank, rather it also depends on the market investment opportunities. Many banks keep too much cash or 
liquid assets with a lower return because of the limited or the lack of business prospects and chances. 
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Table 3: Evolution of some of financial variables and  financial soundness  of  74 banks vs. of 241 banks (the amounts in 
millions US$) 
 
 
2010 2009 2008 2007 2005 2000 1997 
15 
countries 
5  
countries
15  
countries
5  
countries
15  
countries 
5  
countries
15  
countries 
5  
countries
15  
countries 
5  
countries
15  
countries 
5  
countries 
15  
countries 
5  
countries 
Total Assets 1,733,868 256,105 1,625,372 242,892 1,535,811 240,476 1,298,069 198,301 714,509 120,954 388,042 76,650 287,251 64,085 
Deposits and 
ST  funding 1,337,667 213,546
1,258,51
3 200,958 1,205,933 198,183 1,019,653 169,831 548,317 103,032 319,609 66,523 240,570 55,255 
Equity 239,718 23,709 219,997 21,848 194,644 18,693 164,746 13,662 94,930 8,305 41,237 4,544 26,987 3,643 
Net Income 23,438 2,259 19,748 2,013 23,100 2,144 26,919 1,364 17,645 581 5,156 513 3,776 346,933 
Assets Quality 
Loan Loss 
Reserve / 
Gross Loans 
3.99 15.05 3.74 14.66 2.76 15.91 2.80 14.69 3.78 14.48 8.23 11.28 7.82 11.43 
NPL / Gross 
Loans 5.52 13.58 4.83 11.54 2.78 8.95 2.61 14.71 3.19 20.79 9.86 17.57 9.46 11.25 
NCO / Average 
Gross Loans 0.64 0.72 0.26 0.24 0.13 0.33 0.20 0.42 0.49 0.59 0.45 0.41 0.53 0.41 
NPL / Equity 23.21 72.47 20.86 56.13 13.30 42.27 11.09 110.01 13.11 165.39 46.12 23.20 42.05 16.25 
Capital 
Equity / Total 
Assets 13.83 9.26 13.54 9.00 12.67 7.77 12.69 6.89 13.29 6.87 10.63 5.93 9.39 5.69 
Capital Funds / 
Liabilities 17.55 10.80 17.10 10.27 15.50 8.64 15.27 7.83 15.73 7.48 12.02 6.30 10.59 6.05 
Equity / Net 
Loans 24.82 25.51 23.99 24.20 21.80 20.28 24.73 18.99 26.34 16.93 24.52 11.34 20.79 12.72 
Equity / Cust 
and Short Term 
Funding 
17.16 11.06 17.37 10.80 15.25 9.43 15.39 8.04 16.11 8.06 11.35 6.83 11.15 6.59 
Operations 
Net Interest 
Margin 3.03 2.45 3.08 2.62 3.16 2.61 3.22 2.07 3.47 2.01 2.98 1.52 3.18 1.60 
Return on 
Average Assets 
(ROAA) 
1.40 0.93 1.26 0.87 1.63 0.98 2.45 0.78 2.77 0.52 1.38 0.71 1.38 0.61 
Return on 
Average Equity 
(ROAE) 
10.25 10.12 9.58 10.16 12.86 13.27 18.76 11.10 21.83 7.33 13.10 11.90 14.94 11.03 
Cost to Income 
Ratio 39.59 39.97 40.60 46.63 39.42 40.75 36.28 53.29 35.05 43.85 47.79 49.09 49.70 59.87 
Liquidity 
Net Loans / 
Total Assets 55.29 36.31 55.90 36.78 56.24 37.94 51.07 36.29 50.30 40.43 43.34 52.26 45.18 44.68 
Net Loans / 
Customer and 
ST Funding 
70.90 43.56 72.07 44.42 70.70 45.99 64.47 42.37 64.64 47.45 51.83 60.22 53.90 51.82 
Net Loans / Tot 
Dep and Bor 66.37 44.25 68.47 44.77 66.80 48.00 60.82 46.79 60.86 50.16 51.13 57.59 52.76 50.72 
Liquid Assets / 
Cust and ST 
Funding 
27.77 43.68 27.73 46.65 26.47 51.25 33.17 51.35 33.34 39.19 46.79 25.34 48.96 33.64 
Note: ST = Short Term; NPL = Non-performing loans; NCO = Net Charge-off; Cust. = Customer; Tot Dep = Total Deposit 
 
Source: Compiled by the researcher from Bankscope  
 
Since GCC countries are the richest in terms of their GDP and have the highest GDP per capita; then, it is expected that 
the banks in GCC countries outperform other Arab banks in other Arab countries. Therefore, this would be considered as 
an unfair comparison. Therefore, Table 4 presents the comparison between 74 banks in five countries versus 142 banks 
in nine Arab countries excluding banks in GCC countries. The results in Table 4 are almost the same as in Table 3. The 
performances of 74 banks in five countries were much inferior compare to the 142 banks in nine countries. These results 
approve the earlier findings that the economic conditions and the business environments at these five countries were very 
bad. 
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Table 4: Evolution of some of financial variables and  financial soundness  of  74 banks vs. of 142 banks (the amounts in 
millions US$) 
 
 
2010 2009 2008 2007 2005 2000 1997 
9 
countries 
5  
countries 
9 
countries 
5  
countries
9  
countries 
5  
countries 
9 
 countries 
5  
countries 
9
countries 
5  
countries
9  
countries
5  
countries 
9/1998  
countries 
5  
countries 
Total Assets 523,848 256,105 470,370 242,892 414,935 240,476 361,267 198,301 220,524 120,954 126,348 76,650 104,447 64,085 
Deposits and 
ST  funding 422,934 213,546 378,087 200,958 339,295 198,183 297,562 169,831 170,843 103,032 103,081 66,523 85,595 55,255 
Equity 56,765 23,709 48,630 21,848 40,472 18,693 35,483 13,662 20,192 8,305 9,964 4,544 8,077 3,643 
Net Income 6,163 2,259 5,358 2,013 5,109 2,144 4,165 1,364 1,706 581 969 513 929 346,933 
Assets Quality   
Loan Loss 
Reserve / 
Gross Loans 
4.55 15.05 4.52 14.66 4.17 15.91 4.46 14.69 5.30 14.48 7.58 11.28 6.07 11.43 
NPL / Gross 
Loans 6.48 13.58 6.99 11.54 5.23 8.95 6.00 14.71 7.60 20.79 10.59 17.57 6.96 11.25 
NCO / Average 
Gross Loans 0.13 0.72 -0.24 0.24 0.07 0.33 0.04 0.42 0.58 0.59 0.25 0.41 -0.10 0.41 
NPL / Equity 25.26 72.47 27.54 56.13 21.51 42.27 22.30 110.01 24.50 165.39 45.88 23.20 31.13 16.25 
Capital   
Equity / Total 
Assets 10.84 9.26 10.34 9.00 9.75 7.77 9.82 6.89 9.16 6.87 7.89 5.93 7.73 5.69 
Capital Funds / 
Liabilities 12.29 10.80 11.67 10.27 10.94 8.64 10.96 7.83 10.11 7.48 8.57 6.30 8.40 6.05 
Equity / Net 
Loans 23.94 25.51 24.23 24.20 22.89 20.28 24.25 18.99 24.18 16.93 19.37 11.34 17.77 12.72 
Equity / Cust 
and Short Term 
Funding 
14.82 11.06 13.91 10.80 12.54 9.43 11.33 8.04 11.74 8.06 9.09 6.83 9.60 6.59 
Operations   
Net Interest 
Margin 2.93 2.45 2.81 2.62 3.16 2.61 3.49 2.07 3.49 2.01 2.96 1.52 3.42 1.60 
Return on 
Average 
Assets (ROAA) 
1.24 0.93 1.22 0.87 1.32 0.98 1.38 0.78 0.88 0.52 0.81 0.71 0.94 0.61 
Return on 
Average Equity 
(ROAE) 
11.73 10.12 12.10 10.16 13.49 13.27 13.53 11.10 9.78 7.33 10.52 11.90 12.41 11.03 
Cost to Income 
Ratio 45.67 39.97 47.19 46.63 45.70 40.75 47.79 53.29 52.63 43.85 57.96 49.09 57.37 59.87 
Liquidity   
Net Loans / 
Total Assets 45.29 36.31 42.53 36.78 42.34 37.94 40.32 36.29 37.86 40.43 40.69 52.26 43.49 44.68 
Net Loans / 
Customer and 
ST Funding 
56.13 43.56 52.89 44.42 51.71 45.99 48.92 42.37 48.87 47.45 49.86 60.22 53.07 51.82 
Net Loans / Tot 
Dep and Bor 54.80 44.25 51.89 44.77 50.06 48.00 47.28 46.79 41.41 50.16 51.53 57.59 52.30 50.72 
Liquid Assets / 
Cust and ST 
Funding 
34.43 43.68 37.44 46.65 40.07 51.25 42.14 51.35 46.90 39.19 36.26 25.34 38.10 33.64 
Note: ST = Short Term; NPL = Non-performing loans; NCO = Net Charge-off; Cust. = Customer; Tot Dep = Total Deposit 
 
Source: Compiled by the researcher from Bankscope  
 
 Concluding Remarks 4.
 
Investigating the growth and evolution of Arab banks, one would say that overall banks in Arab countries are doing 
extremely well in their performance. Therefore, the economy and the business environment are very good as well. 
However, getting closer to the top performers, one can notice that the top performing banks were not coming from the 
banks in five countries (Egypt, Libya, Syria, Tunisia and Yemen), rather they were coming from the GCC countries. First, 
the top four banks according to the size of total assets are from Qatar and Saudi Arabia. Second, the best four banks 
according to their net income are from Qatar, Saudi Arabia and UAE. Finally, 22 banks out of 30 most efficient banks, 
according to ROAA, were from the six GCC countries. Therefore, 104 GCC commercial and Islamic banks, out of total 
315 Arab banks, mainly were lifting the frontier upward.  
According to Banker (2010) 84 Arab banks entered the list of the world’s top 1,000 worldwide banks. 58 of those 
Arab banks were based in the GCC. GCC Banks had a fairly diversified portfolio. GCC Banks have placed the greatest 
proportion of their funds in lending to the retail, wholesale trade and construction sectors. The GCC countries, in other 
words, lived to some extent in their own world, with their own prosperity, even apart from the rest of the Arab countries. 
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In contrast, the majority of banks in the five countries were mainly below the average in their size and performance. 
Their ranking, regionally and globally, in terms of size, performance and efficiency were weak. The regional and world 
ranking of these banks gives a glimpse of the business atmosphere in these countries. The governments in those five 
countries could not create a good business environment, attract foreign investors and generate the confidence in local 
investors to invest in their countries. They did not invest properly to get their people out of poverty. The close environment 
of the economy in general could not create a sustainable growth of employment. Therefore, the unemployment rate was 
high in most of those five highly populated countries. As a consequence, the demonstrations kicked off a wave of protests 
seeking for changes. The demonstrators were out seeking for the change of power with a hope that change would bring 
them prosperity and a better life.  
All in all, banks’ performance is the reflection of the size and type of business environment within the economy. 
Banks’ indicators can give a good, quick insight into the economy, the business environment and foreign and local 
investors’ confidence in a country. The paper illustrates that wherever banks’ performances were good that is an 
indication of the openness of the market for investment and the healthy environment for all business sectors. On the other 
hand, slow growth in size and bad performance of banks indicate the lack of economic growth, a highly controlled private 
sector, poor investment environment and the lack of attracting foreign investors. As a result, there will be a weak labour 
market leading to high unemployment rate. This is exactly what happened in five countries (Egypt, Libya, Syria, Tunisia, 
and Yemen). Other Arab countries that are following the same strategy will face the same fate. 
The analysis suggests that a bank's performance will depend on the nature of the economic conditions as well as 
on the individual bank's business strategy. General economic conditions may end up being more important than a bank's 
risk management and general business practices, as well as its customer base in accounting for the variability of its 
performance. Bank performance has been heavily dependent upon local economic conditions. Many researchers (see 
Samolyk, 1994) observe that banking sector problems may be constrained by the poor economic activity in financially 
distressed regions, whereas no such relationship has been found in financially healthy regions.  
Overall, the connection between economic conditions and the performance of banks is straightforward. From the 
analysis, economic conditions have had significant effects on of the 74 banks. 74 banks’ performance appears not only to 
be  a good reflection of the economic conditions of the five countries, but also, it was a significantly good predictor of what 
would happen if things were kept moving at the same pace of growth.  
The Arab Spring was shocking news for many governments; however, it was even more important that the Arab 
world continued to prioritize economic, social and human development; the alleviation of poverty and illiteracy; creation of 
job opportunities and health care. Banks’ size and performance were good indicators and predictors of what had 
happened in a number of Arab countries. As an extension to this study, the author suggests conducting an empirical 
study using parametric techniques, to determine exactly which factors affected the Arab Spring.  
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